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INTRODUCTION 
The economic efficiency and safety of any power plant depends on the proper 
functioning of its component systems. The functioning of such systems (e.g., piping) is 
evaluated through performance of periodic nondestructive examinations (NDE). The results 
of these examinations determine actions the power plant owner must take regarding inspected 
components. If a component is found malfunctioning or containing a defect, the owner may 
decide to repair or replace the component. If the results of NDE indicates that the component 
is functioning as it should or is defect-free, he would most certainly take no action but to 
record such a finding for future reference. Any action the owner takes, though, depends on 
NDE results and involves risks associated with either not identifying defective components 
or mislabeling components defective when they are not. Nuclear power plants, because of 
their unique circumstances, must pay costs for these types of errors that far exceed those in 
other industries. This paper depicts the framework for relating inspection capability to the 
economics of power plant operation. 
COMPONENT RELIABILITY 
Reliability is typically treated as a function of the probability of failure as a 
function of time [1]. As time continues, the probability of failure may decrease, remain 
constant or increase, depending on the nature of a component and environment and loadings to 
which the component is subjected. For many components this variation of probability of 
failure over time is described by a "bathtub" hazard function [2]. Such a function is shown in 
Fig. 1. The first portion of curve describes the time period when fabricated components are 
initially inspected to weed out defective ones before service and to replace components that 
fail early in their lives. This duration in a nuclear power plant context would be called the 
pre-service inspection period or PSI. The probability of failure decreases because of the 
elimination of a high percentage of defective components. 
The central portion of the curve represents a span of time where the probability of 
failure is relatively constant and failures are considered to be chance failures attributed to 
events such as rapid change in component stress loading or variations in the environment of 
the component (e.g., higher temperatures than normal). During this period of time, power 
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plants perform in-service inspections, called lSI's. The last portion of curve describes an 
increasing probability of failure due to aging, wear, and cycling effects. The results of the lSI 
inspections are typically coupled with findings from material characterization and fracture 
mechanics to ensure that a minimum of components are remaining during the final segment of 
the bathtub curve. Restricting ourselves to the middle portion of the bathtub curve, the 
probability of failure is essentially independent of time, and depends only on the quality of 
the components and the ability to correctly assess their integrity. 
TIME INDEPENDENT RELIABILITY 
One very informative formulation of time independent reliability is given in [3]. This 
formulation considers reliability as a function of component quality and inspection 
capability. Reliability is defined as the probability that a condition that can cause 
malfunctioning or failure does not exist given that, after inspection, no such condition is 
indicated. In terms of conditional probability, 
R = P( nf I ni) 
nf - no failure, (e.g., no flaw that can cause failure) 
ni - no indication of such a flaw 
Using Bayes theorem, an explicit expression for reliability, R, can be developed that 
is a function of component quality and inspection capability. The following mimics the 
development found in [3]. 
or 
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P( nf I ni) * P(ni) = P( ni I nf)' P(nf) 
P(ni) - Probability of no indication 
P(nf) - Probability of no failure (flaw) 
R = P( ni I nf) * penD 
P(ni) 
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Figure 1. "Bathtub" curve showing variation 
of failure rate over time 
(l) 
The probability of no indication, P(nO is a combination of the probabilities that no indication 
will occur when one should and when one shouldn't: 
P(ni) = P( ni I f) * P(f>+ P( ni I nf) * P( nf) 
Substituting into (1). 
R = P( ni I nf ) * pen£) 
P( ni I nf) * pen£) + P( ni I f) * p(n 
and, after identifying like terms, 
R = ___ -:"-__ _ (2) 
1 + P( ni I f) * P<O 
P( ni I nf) * pent) 
In (2) it should be noted that the terms P(f), P(nf) are a function of the component's state alone 
and do not depend on inspection capability. The remaining two terms depend on inspection 
capability and component quality. Equation (2) can be simplified by defining two 
parameters-Quality Index, and Success Probability Ratio. 
Quality Index 
As noted, the terms P(f) and P(nf) are independent of inspection capability. These 
terms are related by 
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Fig. 2. Variation of Quality Index (QI) as a 
function of Probability of Flaw 
1.0 
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An intuitive sense of quality suggests that quality is inversely related to the probability of 
failure or of a flaw: The greater this probability, the less quality one would attribute to a 
component. Also, if the probability of a flaw were 1, then one would expect no quality or "0" 
quality. These feelings can be represented by the following expression: 
QI = 1 - P(f) 
P(f) 
(3) 
Fig. 2 shows the variation of QI as a function of P(f). We can substitute (3) into (2) getting, 
R = 1 
1 + P( ni I f) 
P( ni I nf) * QI 
Success Probability Ratio 
The two remaining probabilistic terms are related to inspection capability through 
the chance of getting no indication of a failure or flaw after an inspection. The following 
relationships hold: 
P( ni I f) = 1 - P(i I f) 
P( ni I nf) = 1 - PO I nf) 
The expression P( i If) is the probability of an indication of a flaw given that a flaw exists 
(of a failure, given a failure is possible). The more common term for this probability is 
"Probability of Detection" or POD. Likewise, the expression P( i I nf) is the probability of an 
indication flaw given there is no flaw. This probability is commonly called the "False 
Alarm Rate," FAR. Using the acronyms POD and FAR and substituting into (2): 
R = 1 
1 + I-POD 
(l-FAR)* QI 
We can define "Success Probability Ratio" as 
SPR = 1- FAR 
I-POD 
(4) 
Again, this is intuitive in that as POD increases toward 1, SPR or successful detection 
increases; and as FAR increases toward 1, successful detections decrease. Fig. 3 shows the 
variation of SPR for different PODs with P(f); FAR fixed at 0.02. Expression (4) can be 
substituted in (2) to give the following form for reliability: 
R = 1 
1+ __ 1_ (5) 
SPR*QI 
RELIABILITY AS FUNCTION OF INSPECTION CAP ABILITY 
The reliability of a component cannot be changed by inspecting it, but the reliability 
of a collection of components can be improved by repairing or replacing defective components. 
Inspection helps to identify which components to replace or repair. Expression (5) can be used 
to show the effects of inspection on reliability. First note that with no inspection POD = FAR 
= 0, or SPR = 1. This leads to 
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Rb = 1 
1+_1_ 
QI 
01 = 1 - P(f). (6) 
QI+ 1 
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Fig. 3. Success Probability Ratio (SPR) variation 
with Probability of Detection 
Rb = Reliability before inspection 
1.0 
Refer to Fig. 4. The x-axis of Fig. 4 is 1 - P(f) and represents reliability before 
inspection. Using the y-axis to represent reliability after inspection, the line labeled "No 
Inspection" shows that no change in reliability takes place. Now note that from (6), 
P(f) = 1- Rb 
QI = 1- P(f) 
P(f) 
R= 1 
1 +...l..:..B1L 
Rb 
-R!L.. 
1-Rb 
= Rb 
When inspection is used POD -I 0, and FAR -10; SPR -I 1. 
For example, if POD = 0.5 and FAR = 0.02, then 
and 
SPR = 1 - 0.02 = 1.96 
1- 5 
R= 1 
1+ l-Rb 
1.96*Rb 
1.96 * Rb 
1 + 0.96* Rb 
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Fig. 4. Reliability as a function of Probability of Detection; 
False Alarm Rate = .02 
if POD = .85, FAR = 0.02, 
SPR = 1 - 0.02 = 6.53, 
1-0.85 
R = 6.53" Rb 
1 + 5.53" Rb 
These two examples are shown in Fig. 4. 
FALSE CALL RATE 
1.0 
It is often confusing to hear the terms False Alarm Rate and False Call Rate. They 
are not synonymous. False Alarm Rate is the probability of an indication of a flaw given no 
flaw exists. It is P( i I nf). On the other hand, False Call Rate is the probability of no flaw 
being present given there is an indication of a flaw. It is P( nf Ii). The False Call Rate is of 
great concern when considering the economics of plant operation. This will be shown later. 
Essentially, the FCR indicates how often unnecessary repairs or replacements take place. 
The FCR and FAR can be related to each other via Bayes theorem. 
FCR = P( nf Ii) 
FCR .. P(i) = P( nf Ii)" P(i) = P( i I nf)" P(nf) 
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FCR = PO I nEl' P(nf) 
PO> 
P(i I nf)' P(nf) + P( i If)' P(f) 
1 + PO If)' PH) 
P(i I nf)' P(nf) 
FCR = _---'-I __ 
I + POD 
FAR *QI 
If a component as a P(f) = .05, then QI = 19. With a POD = .85, 
FCR = _--'--__ 
1+~ 
FAR * 19 
For example, if FAR = 0.02, FCR = .301 
19 * FAR 
19 * FAR + 0.85 
Fig. 5 shows how FCR varies with FAR. 
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COST CONSIDERATIONS 
The risks [4] associated with inspection capability are based on the costs paid by 
power plant owners as a result of inspection-based decisions. There are two reasonable 
dedsions that can be made. The component being inspected contains a critical flaw or it 
doesn't. These decisions correlate directly with inspection results, (no indication, no flaw-
indication, flaw). Economic risk becomes apparent in that wrong decisions can lead to costly 
actions. Deciding that a flawless component has a flaw costs a power plant outage time (Le., 
time to repair or replace the "bad" component) with the assodated loss of revenue and costs 
paid to another utility for replacement power for their customers. There is also the loss of 
credibility regarding inspection capability, a situation that has direct effects on the 
implementation of their inspection programs, considering regulators such as the NRC. On the 
other hand, missing a flaw can lead to a very costly unscheduled outage. This happens when 
a critical flaw actually causes component failure. 
Risk can be defined as the expected cost of making a particular decision or taking 
certain actions based on information. The risk, Rsk( nf I ni), deciding no flaw when there is 
no indication, can be written as: 
where 
Rsk( nf I ni) = C( nf, nf) .. P( nf I ni >+ C( nf, f) .. P(f I ni ) 
C( nf, nO = 
C( f, nf) = 
Cost for actions assodated with no flaw situations 
(inspection cost) 
Cost for actions associated with flaw situations where 
no corrective action is taken (forced outage, loss of 
credibility, etc.). Most of these costs can be avoided. 
Noting that P(f I ni) = 1 - P( nf I ni) = 1 - R 
(R = Reliability) 
Rsk( nf I ni) = C( nf, nf ) .. R + C( f, nf ) .. (1 - R) 
= C( f, nf ) + R .. [ C( nf, nf ) - C( f, nt ) 1 
As R approaches 1, Rsk( nt I ni) approaches C( nt, nt ), the cost of inspection. 
Reliability less than 1 will cause a fraction of the costs assodated with a missed flaw to be 
included in the risk of saying 'No flaw" when there is no indication of a flaw. Since these 
costs are quite large, the risk is severely affected. 
The other risk case is calling a flaw when a flaw is indicated. This is written as: 
Rsk(f I i) = C(f, f) .. P(f I i) + C( nf, 0 .. P( nf Ii) 
CU,O -
C( nl, f)-
The cost of actions associated with calling a flaw a flaw 
such as outage time, repair or replacement costs, and 
soon 
The cost of actions associated with calling a flaw when 
no flaw is present. These costs are the same as C( f, f ) 
but are avoidable. 
For this case, P( t Ii) = P( nf Ii) = 1 - FCR (FCR = False Call Rate) 
Rsk( f Ii) = C( f, t ) .. (1 - FCR) + C( nt, t ) .. FCR 
= C( f, f ) + FCR .. [ C( nf, f ) - C( t, f ) ] 
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Because [ C( nf, f ) - C( f, f ) ] > 0, Rsk( f Ii) is reduced as FCR tends toward zero. 
CONCLUSION 
Component reliability depends on the initial quality of the component and how that 
varies over the life of the component. Quality is related to the probability of a critical flaw 
occurring within the component and can be quantified via the "Quality Index" for time 
independent assumptions. Component reliability also depends on inspection capability. This 
capability is quantified through the "Success Probability Ratio." Time independent 
reliability can be written as a function of QI and SPR. 
Power plant costs associated with the actions pursued as a result of inspection results 
can be cast in a risk (expected cost) framework. Under this formulation, improving reliability 
and reducing the false call rate reduces the risk associated with power plant costs. 
REFERENCES 
1. K. C. Kapur, L. R. Lamberson, Reliability in Enl:ineerin& Desi&!, (John Wiley & Sons, 
New York, 1977). 
2. J. Endrenyi, Reliability Modelin& in Electric Power Sjrstems (John Wiley & Sons, 
Chichester, 1978). 
3. S. H. Bush, Reliability of Nondestructive Examination (Battelle Pacific Northwest 
Laboratory, Richland, Washington, 1983) Vol. 3 NUREG/CR-3110, pp. 13A.3.1 -
13A.3.1O 
4. R. O. Duda, P. E. Hart, Pattern Classification and Scene Analysis (John Wiley & 
Sons, New York, 1973). 
2233 
